Noesis 76 - December 1992 Chris Langan to Robert Hannon
09/09/92
Dear Bob: I received your 9-page letter last week. You must be one expert typist!
I don't currently have time to address all of your points in detail. But I do have several observations to make regarding your theory.
Specifically, I note several apparent inconsistencies in your letter of 8/31/92. Maybe I'm "just not getting it", but that's the way it looks to me. Before engaging you in any prolonged dialogue, I must ascertain whether or not our thought processes are sufficiently comparable to make it worthwhile.
But first, a couple of ground rules. In answering my questions, please try to avoid statements like: "This is the result of typical misinterpretations of ( ) regarding ( )." They're too easy to make, and don't stand up under any kind of analysis. Try instead to give precise reasons for your position. To be acceptable, these must implicitly or explicitly cover the exhaustive set of specific disjunctive cases to which your position applies.
Please define your terms. Many interdependent terms are commonly defined inconsistently with respect to each other. If others before you have used them without properly defining them, so what? All you'd be doing is propagating the errors you say these other have made. For example, if the word "pro-choice" is merely a vague convention requiring no definition, then what do you think you're "protecting" by your stand on abortion? If nothing at all - i.e., if your stand "was determined at the instant time began" and was not itself "chosen" - then consistency requires that you delete or replace the misleading term ("choice") from your argument (if your use of misleading terms was also "determined at the instant time began", then my asking you to change them was, too, and I'll just have to hope the same for your cooperation). Allowing "seeming inconsistencies" in dialogues (item 6 in your 8/31/92 letter) is counterproductive. Any unresolved inconsistency renders a dialogue potentially worthless; a single irresolvable paradox would destroy all of its supposed information.
Please avoid unjustified pronouncements like: "'Past certainty and future uncertainty' assumes the validity of the uncertainty principle." Future uncertainty no more assumes quantum uncertainty than does the uncertainty of a fly about whether you plan to swat it, a computer about what you'll next punch up on its keyboard, or Las Vegas about whether the Giants will beat the Jets. Since all these kinds of future uncertainty do exist in present reality, the subquoted phrase can be justified without Heisenberg's input. It is your unproven claim that uncertainty is eradicable which requires extraordinary justification. And c = (frequency x wavelength) is not an instance of quantum complementarity (item 9 in your 8/31 letter). The term "c" is not a complete state-descriptor for any quantum; it is a velocital constant which fails to specify position or even the direction in which a photon is moving. Please try to refrain from using so-called "arguments from authority" (example: paragraph 2, item 12, same letter). As you opine yourself in item j, "there is no such thing as an 'authority' in any area of knowledge." Whether or not you're right, the nature of our respective theses verifies your statement for the purposes of this exchange.
Please avoid arguments based on the supposed "naivety" evident, in conceptual developments. For example, I don't care how well Einstein or Heisenberg was able to rationalize his ideas at the time they were produced, or how many helpers were necessary to come up with current rationalizations. Einstein and Heisenberg might still have been "lucky", and their ideas correct. (Re SR: the idea of homogeneous isotropy is literally ancient, and sets the cosmological stage for the development of Einstein's mind and ideas. It is extremely unlikely to be a "later revision" of his thought.)
Please avoid phrases like "I do/do not believe in/that ( )" unless you mean to propose a specific a priori (universal, logically necessary) axiom. That way, all I have to do is find or rule out a counterexample to determine the validity of your "belief".
And finally, since I'm tentatively giving you credit for being as smart as you think you are - i.e., smarter than the vast majority of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers - please try to refrain from ad hominem attacks on their abilities. If some theorists have erred with respect to your own theories, describe the errors and explain why your view is better. Otherwise, it may not be clear to me that the supposed errors exist, or that your interpretations regarding their stupidity are valid.
Here are my questions.
1. If "we and the rest of nature are automata" (first paragraph, page 2 in your letter of 08/07/92), then everybody and everything computes, provided that "computation" is defined relative to the automata in question (e.g., as information transduction). Yet, in paragraph 3, item 12, 08/31/92, you state: "Frankly, my hackles rise when people attempt to apply 'computability' to domains to which such a concept is intrinsically inapplicable." Your first statement seems to imply that (generalized) computation theory is universally applicable. But your second statement directly contradicts this implication, given that computability is a very general concept defined for universal machines and thus for all varieties of automata.
Feel free to check it out. Turing was very specific about what he meant by a "universal machine". It is a hypothetical mechanical and therefore physical device which can compute anything any other physical automaton can compute, and what it can't compute, no physical automaton can compute. So anything incomputable to it is incomputable to every other physical automaton. As Turing proved that some things are in fact incomputable to universal machines, they are mechanically incomputable in general. In particular, if "we and the rest of nature are automata", then they are incomputable relative to us and relative to nature (where "nature" means physical reality). You seem to have overlooked this crucial fact. Given that mechanism and determinism are synonymous in their usual senses, I had assumed that your stands on the determinacy and automatonic character of nature were mutually compatible. Now I'm not so sure. What is your actual position?
2. In paragraph 1, item 12, 08/31, you state that "Godel's theory is a formal mathematical-logical analysis dealing only with formal mathematical-logical systems. Its extrapolation to other domains has no premise...". To formalize a theory is simply to put it in strict logical form, and logic is just the "resident language" of the human brain. So what applies to formalized theories can be "extrapolated" to whatever the brain "theorizes" about. The formal system treated by Godel is a theory of arithmetic. Reality is arithmetically structured. If Godel's theorems apply to arithmetic, and arithmetic applies to reality in general, then how can Godel's theorems not apply to reality?
Every theory which describes reality, including your version of "physics", is logicomathematical in structure and formalizable. If it isn't, it isn't correct. So you understand reality only through formalizable mathematical theories, and what applies to them necessarily applies to your understanding of reality. Since you can say nothing of reality beyond what you understand of it, you are prohibited from saying that Godel's theorems "do not apply to reality". To do so would be like saying that while the formalized set of colors { red, blue, green } has variety 3, the real set of red, blue, and green objects can have chromatic variety not 3. In either case, you are saying that while arithmetic can be applied to physical reality, certain arithmetical theorems applying to formalized arithmetic cannot.
The position that undecidability is a "purely subjective" property of subjective theories assumes that subjectivity and objectivity can always be distinguished. But human brains are objectively real even when theorizing subjectively about reality. This annihilates the supposed distinction, and the associated position becomes flatly absurd. Brains are reality theorizing about reality, and what exists for (the logicomathematical language of) the brain ipso facto exists for (the perceived language of) reality. This universal kind of self-reference contains more than enough room for Godelistic paradox and its metaphysical implications.
This is a very precise chain of reasoning. If you think you can interdict it, then exactly where, why, and how?
(If all this seems like "jargon", then here's a graphical version. Take a sheet of paper and draw three concentric circles. Starting with the innermost circle, label them for the following contexts: the formalized theory of arithmetic T, your brain, and reality. T (which stands for arithmetically-based mathematics in general) exists in your brain in the sense that it corresponds to a pattern of neural events created as you "theorize", and this neurological chunk of spacetime in turn exists in reality. Now, if you can perform the following trick, I'll believe that you are correct in excluding undecidability from reality: simply figure out a way to write "undecidability" just once such that it is entirely inside the innermost circle - where you say it belongs - but outside the outer circle marked "reality". Good luck.
If you'd like to point out that "undecidability" is also confined to the brain circle and therefore applies only to human brains, you're quite welcome. That's all it has to apply to. Every bit of real data you can acquire and process goes through your brain. So the brain is as good as reality for purposes of distributing undecidability over human perception and cognition. In fact, a theory of physics is just a set of mathematical formulae whose variables have "real" interpretations. So you can draw another circle marked "physics" inside the T circle, assuming that you left enough room when you wrote "undecidability" there. And since physics explains observable reality in general, you can draw yet another circle inside the physics circle, to represent your observations. Doesn't it look as though "formal undecidability" covers them now, too?)
3. In paragraph 7, page 1, 08/07/92, you state that examples of quantum uncertainty are really examples of "highly complex causality". In paragraph 2, item 8, 08/31/92, you further "postulate...complexity and interaction..." in quantum causality. Yet, in item 1, 08/31/92, you state "I disagree that reality is complex...it is the philosopher (or scientist) who makes it complex." Causality is an aspect of reality. If causality is "highly complex", then reality is "highly complex". What gives?
4. In item 9, 08/31, you seem to equate the uncertainty principle with "non-causality". You appear to say that being uncertain about what causes an event is the same as denying that a cause exists. This is like saying that because my dog can't understand English, English does not exist (or at least make sense) in the world inhabited by my dog. It's like saying that because some people are blind, sight does not exist in the world they inhabit. But since I live in the same world, speak English, and see, I find this kind of reasoning very questionable.
My dog has a brain. He thinks, albeit "nonabstractly". If this analogy is inapplicable to human brains, then why? I.e., what is there about a human brain that entitles it to assert that whatever it doesn't specifically understand is "unreal"? Now, I know that human brains differ from dog brains. But to reach a conclusion analogous to yours, I'll need critical neurological distinctions. And how can a blind man infer the "nonexistence" of sight and color from the fact that he can only feel some kinds of radiation and hear others talk about colors...just as you, whose brain is admittedly constructed to ignore the impossibility of choice, can only feel that you are making choices, and hear others talk of supposedly nonexistent things like "choice", "free will", and "quantum uncertainty"?
If you have a formal, logical reason for equating potential limitations in your own powers of thought and observation with "non-causality", what is it?
5. You admit the existence of only one force, electromagnetism. There are many thinkers who, like you, are trying to explain the "other forces" of nature in terms of one overall force. But they are compelled to do this at a level of generality at which certain distinctions among the components of reality are precluded by high energy-densities. If your theory contains no allowance for this kind of physical generalization - which in the Big Bang theory takes the form of a temporal regression to the first superhot 10-41 seconds of physical reality - then it is inconsistent with respect to observed interactions among matter. E.g., what accounts for the selectivity and extreme range variations among what common scientists see as the four fundamental forces of nature, but which you see only as electricity and magnetism?
6. Since you seem to be well-versed on SR, I'll beg your pardon ahead of time in case I'm being thick-headed.
The way I learned about Special Relativity, two frames of reference K and K' moving at relativistic velocities with respect to each other coincide at the moment a flash of light occurs at their mutual origin. In this scenario, one can talk about an arbitrary single point on the boundary of the expanding sphere of light as measured by each frame, and what each frame says about the other frame's internal measurements relative to its own. Since this tableau is perfectly accomodated by the theory, I don't see why it is "always intrinsic" that "two things are separately moving, one relative to each frame of reference" (item 16, 08/31).
I'm also confused by what seems to be your statement that c is the only permissible velocity in SR ("The LT equations . . . apply only to those objects moving at x/t = C = x'/t' " : paragraph 6, item 16, 8/31). The Lorentz transformation, which you say is "the entire mathematical premise of SR", is based on the Pythagorean metric of continuous Euclidean space in light of c-invariance. This metric accomodates a full range of relative velocities; there is nothing about it or the transformation that "prefers" v = c. If, as you say, the LT was initially applied only in light of c-invariance and not c-maximality, so what? Many general formulae are derived and applied within restricted contexts. Children learn to count on their fingers, but realize even as they do that numbers apply to other kinds of objects.
Can you offer any coherent reasons for the limitations you seem to have placed on SR? In particular, can you explain why the mass increase has been observed in particle accelerators from Moscow to California, why time dilation effects have been measured on moving airplanes, and why no physicist or astronomer has ever seen anything outrace a beam of light?
7. If, in order to measure a particle (or wave), we need to use an amount of mass-energy that will disrupt its motion, then we cannot verify the operation of any specific determinant or causal principle with respect to "what would have been" its trajectory. We can only assume that such a principle would have applied had we not interfered with it. This is a physical limitation on what kind of information we can get by physical means. This limitation certainly exists at the quantum level. Whether we call it "quantum uncertainty" or not, "uncertainty" is what it implies with respect to the verificative information it precludes. This establishes that there is real, physical information to which physical access can never be possible in advance. Yet, in paragraph 7, 8/07, you deny the possibility of such a situation, and in item 7, 8/31, you deny that "any aspect of nature/reality" is inaccessible to you. The verification or observation of current states is clearly an aspect of "nature/reality" essential to human knowledge. How can you predict quantum events based on unverifiable current states? And how can you verify the action of causal principles except by assuming without logical basis that what (you think) you've observed in the past will recur arbitrarily?
Let's consider a related problem. Suppose that you have a complete set of deterministic principles in hand. To keep track of the precise physical states of the universe on which such principles act, you need physical memory-space. Given that the universe has to "dump" (or at least hide) past information to make room for present information, where will you store yours while you extract implications affecting future states? And any algorithm you use to compute future reality must run in physical time, which is full of chaotic processes allowing no computative shortcuts and thus requiring explicit simulation. Some chaotic systems evolve at near-maximal rates. What assurances do you have that you can always "outrun" them? (You seem to admit the existence of chaos, or irreducible dynamical complexity, in paragraph 2, item 8, 8/31. If you now prefer to deny chaotic limits on information compression, then what other deterministic mechanism do you propose in order to stop physical information from being "compressed" to nothing?)
In short, those using physical space and time to compute physical reality cannot avoid physical constraints. Why do you think that physical reality is "obligated" to provide you with endless means to circumvent the very constraints that define it?
8. You make much of the distinction between subjective uncertainty and objective indeterminacy (e.g., paragraph 4, item 7, 8/31). So presumably, you have a practical way of telling the difference. If you are chronically uncertain about something, then on what grounds do you guarantee its determinacy? ("Everything must be deterministic" is not an acceptable answer.) And if something looks "nondeterministic", how can you be certain about it? For that matter, how do you propose to distinguish between "subjectivity" and "objectivity"? Your "subjective" cognition takes place within an "objective" brain. And whatever exists "objectively", apart from your brain, must be "subjectivized" by it for cognitive purposes. These predicates, which you treat as "absolutes", are freely interchangeable according to whom is referring to what.
I don't care how many others before you have neglected to clarify these matters; I'd have asked them the same questions. But I'm asking you and want your answers. (The CTMU has been designed to enable the simultaneous treatment of all of these issues (1-8). If you have an alternative approach, here's a chance to explain it.)
Again, please honor all my ground rules about how to answer these questions. If you can, you may find yourself coming to understand these matters even better than you already do. If you can't, then don't be afraid to admit it. I respect a man who can admit his mistakes. The one thing I won't respect is any sign that you've ignored my requests.
There are other points I'd like to cover, but these should keep you busy for the time being. By the way, regarding your comment on the supposed scarcity of geniuses in high-IQ clubs: don't take their treatment of you too hard. Whatever the merits or failings of your own theory, there is no clear indication that any of these people can tell good theories from bad ones.
Try to be patient with them. Their critical abilities have simply been swamped by new information. They think your info is wrong. They think mine is "alien" and incomprehensible. The results are identical. When they think something is "wrong", they refuse to accept it because they're "too smart". When it's alien, they can't accept it because they're too...inertialized in other directions? Anyway, it comes out the same. Never having belonged to a high-IQ group before joining the Noetic Society, I thought I could do something constructive for myself, the group, and everybody else. It doesn't seem to be working out, at least for the other members. But if anyone "loses", it won't be me. And if you lose anything, it will be by your own doing and not theirs.
Finally, one more little piece of advice (I know you're old enough to be my father, but I'm only treating you as an "equal"...i.e., just like I treat everybody else!). A lot of the scientists you seem to regard as mildly retarded are actually pretty smart. Their "programming" may at times seem narrow, but it works very well for certain specialized mental tasks. Don't be too quick to write them off. Beneath their dim-witted naivete may flow an undercurrent of brilliance from which you can profit. Remember, you possess what might be considered an advantage: you have access to their ideas, but they don't yet have access to yours.
Incidentally, I'm sending copies of this letter to Noesis. It may help others understand what the CTMU is about, and why resisting it is pointless. But I also want them to witness your courage in "sticking your neck out" when most of theirs are hidden better than that of an agoraphobic turtle. They can't resolve inconsistencies any better than you can within standard worldviews. The main difference is, they're afraid to show it.
Enough. Time to get started on those questions. And remember: if things get cramped, the CTMU is big enough for both of us.
Regards, Chris Langan
COPYRIGHT 1992 BY C.M. LANGAN. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Copyright (c) 1992 by the Mega Society. All rights reserved. Copyright for each individual contribution is retained by the author unless otherwise indicated.